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The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) culminated decades of dispute 
over natural gas policy and was the "centerpiecew of President Carter's 
National Energy Act. Now there are many issues of both regulatory ana 
legislative concern under discussion. These items were unanticipated by the 
framers of this difficult and delicate compromise. Generally speaking, they 
all stem from the fact that oil prices more than doubled in 1979 and 1980. 
The NGPA1s framers set wellhead gas prices within the new law's framework in 
such a way that they would converge on oil equivalent prices -- as they were 
then perceived -- in real dollar terms by 1985. As events unfolded, the 
statutory pricing schedules that the new law contained became out of context 
with oil prices just a year after NGPA was passed. Additionally, there are a 
significant number of other unanticipated matters related to the nature of 
the regulated gas pipeline industry and its interaction with NGPA that came 
to bear. 
By 1982, dissatisfaction with NGPA was becoming more vocal. Interstate 
gas pipelines were complaining about high wellhead prices in some cases, as 
well as a variety of provisions in Contracts with producers which they found 
disadvantageous. Consumer complaints were being heard because of large 
increases in residential gas bills. And producers voiced concerns about the 
low (relative to oil) prices of some classes of old gas, as well as the price 
caps on "neww gas. 
At issue are a large number of regulatory agency issues and legislative 
changes, which could have the effect of raising prices paid by consumers. On 
the other hand, there could well be a trade-off among some or all of these 
items, involving enhanced domestic gas supply, with attendant benefits 
measured in terms of economics and national security. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) was enacted as one of five major 
energy bills which made up the National Energy Act, but it was unquestionably 
the most controversial and most difficult to enact. That was because the 
NGPA attempted to end a debate that had gone on for 25 years: Should the 
Federal Government regulate the prices at which natural gas producers sell 
gas to interstate natural gas pipelines? 
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (15 U.S.C. 717) (NGA) ordered the Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) to regulate the sale of natural gas in interstate 
commerce for resale. Until 1954, the Federal Power Commission, now called 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), regulated only the 
interstate natural gas pipeline companies that purchased and carried gas from 
the producing companies, most of which were primarily oil companies, for sale 
to the distributing gas utilities that were subject to regulations by State 
utility commissions. In that year, however, the Supreme Court decided, in 
Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Wisconsin (347 U.S. 672), that sales by natural 
gas producers to pipelines were "sales for resalew within the meaning of the 
Natural Gas Act, and that producers' sales should be regulated by the FPC. 
The FPC attempted to carry out this mandate first on a company-by-company 
basis in traditional utility fashion, and then by setting ceiling prices for 
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sales in designated producing regions based on average costs of production. 
But a severe shortage of natural gas for customers outside the producing 
States was caused in the early 1970s by the unwillingness of producers to 
commit new finds to regulated pipelines when intrastate buyers could pay 
higher unregulated prices. The FPC attempted to set much higher incentive 
prices on a nationwide basis during the 1970s, but growth of intrastate 
markets and fall-off in new gas discoveries perpetuated the shortage. The 
FPC was fought in court both by consumer interests opposed to the escalating 
prices that resulted and by the producers, who thought the prices were too 
low. Meanwhile, the natural gas industry began to consider possible 
alternate sources of natural gas supply, such as LNG (liquefied natural gas) 
from overseas, methane from coal gasification, imports of natural gas by 
pipeline from Canada and Mexico, synthetic natural gas manufactured from 
liquid petroleum products, generation of methane from animal wastes and 
biomass, and other new or exotic sources of natural gas. The common feature 
of this myriad of new sources was that they presented than higher costs than 
did conventional natural gas -- even than unregulated gas in the intrastate 
market, and most of them suffered from technological, supply security, and 
lead-time. problems. 
Because they lacked adequate supplies of natural. gas to serve all the 
customers on their lines, the interstate natural gas pipelines were forced to 
design and implement, under guidance from the FPC, "curtailment plansH which 
designated priorities among those users who would lose service when there was 
too little gas in the pipe. In general, electric utilities and industrial 
users using natural gas as fuel were deemed the lowest priority, and 
commercial, public and residential users were deemed the highest. Beginning 
in 1971, curtailments of natural gas worsened every year. Supply and 
deliverability problems caused notable curtailments during the very cold 
1976-77 winter. 
Proposals to modify or end producer regulation for natural gas sales had 
been made in every Congress since such regulation was imposed by the 1954 
Supreme Court decision, but the healthy growth of the natural gas industry 
kept the issue from the front burners. With the start of the natural gas 
shortage, however, this changed. In the 92d, 93d, and 94th Congresses, major 
debates took place, but no basic statutory reform was enacted. The debates 
were passionate as producer interests and consumer interests championed their 
concepts of fairness and economic necessity, and conflicting legislation was 
adopted in the Senate and House without success in compromising the 
differences. 
Natural Gas Policy Actions of the 95th Congress 
The 95th Congress' first substantive enactment was emergency natural gas 
legislation to deal with the massive curtailments that then afflicted the 
Nation, caused as much by pipelines' inability to deliver gas quickly enough 
to deal with record-setting cold weather as by the unavailability of natural 
gas supply. The larger issues of producer regulation policy were avoided in 
the interest of haste and because the newly inaugurated Carter Administration 
had promised a major legislative proposal on the topic as part of the 
National Energy Plan submitted in April 1977. 
President Carter's message transmitting the proposed legislation 
emphasized that natural gas was a declining resource to be husbanded. The 
essence of his proposal was that "new natural gas" in both interstate and 
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intrastate markets be subject to a ceiling price of the 3tu equivalent of 
domestic crude oil delivered to refineries, then about $1.75 per thousand 
cubic feet (Mcf). A geological definition was attempted, to distinguish new 
natural gas from that natural gas which had already been discovered or was in 
production. The producing industry uniformly condemned the proposal as an 
extsnsion of regulation at confiscatory prices, lower than prices then 
available in intrastate markets. Consumers likewise attacked it, on the 
basis that the ceiling price was higher than could be justified by the costs 
incurred by producers; but they were happier with it than the producers were. 
Paradoxically, had it been enacted, all other things being equal, new natural 
gas prices would now be deregulated and much higher than they are. The 
President's proposal also included provisions granting higher prices to gas 
from high-cost sources, and allocating the cost of the new natural gas and 
high-cost gas to industrial users. Elsewhere in the National Energy Plan, in 
the portion that became the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 
the President proposed that natural gas use be taxed and regulated out of 
existing industrial boiler-fuel applications and electric utility 
applications, and that a ban be instituted on new applications. 
The House of Representatives, through the formation of an Ad Hoc Energy 
Committee, moved rapidly and enacted the President's plan almost intact. 
There were minor modifications expanding the new gas definition in the 
natural gas portion of the plan, and outright new gas deregulation was voted 
on and defeated. The Senate, however, divided the plan for referral to 
standing committees. 
A deadlocked Senate Energy Committee, split 9-9 on both the President's 
plan and then on new gas deregulation, reported the President's bill without 
recommendation. When an early tabling vote indicated that new gas 
deregulation would pass instead, its opponents mounted a filibuster, and 
President Carter threatened to veto any deregulation measure. But cloture 
was invoked, so opponents began a novel filibuster by demanding roll-call 
votes on hundreds of amendments. Many compromise efforts were tried and 
failed, and the filibuster was finally broken when Vice President Mondale and 
majority leader Byrd succeeded in adopting a rule change making dilatory 
amendments out of order. President Carter apparently did not want the rest 
of his energy proposals held hostage to his gas proposal. The Senate swiftly 
enacted a Pearson-Bentsen substitute bill deregulating new gas after 2 years 
of price ceilings equivalent to distillate fuel oil prices. New gas was 
defined more broadly than in the House bill. 
A conference to resolve the differences between the two approaches was 
begun, with numerous compromise proposals surfacing among moderate groups of 
conferees and then sinking after taking fire from both extremes. Most of the 
shots from the consumer side dealt with the cost of deregulation, the 
billions of dollars of additional producer revenues compared to modest 
increases in new natural gas reserves that were predicted. Most of the shots 
from the gas industry side Concerned the need to produce additional natural 
gas to displace foreign oil, and the burdens of Federal regulation. 
President Carter gradually came to agree to support eventual deregulation 
after an initial period of regulation in both interstate and intrastate 
markets at rising ceiling prices. A deal was narrowly struck, first among 
the evenly divided Senate conferees and the entire Energy Committee, and then 
with the House conferees. After an arduous drafting process by conference 
staff, some last-minute shifts of position by some who had opposed and some 
who had supported the compromise, and a Supreme Court decision in a natural 
gas case which added to the COntrOVersy surrounding it, the conference report 
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was slgned. 
New issues and circumstances had arisen during the lengthy conference 
process which affected the general support of ~ h e  compromise: concerns about 
the enforceability of the extraordinarily complex bill; concern about the 
image growing abroad that the United States was unable to resolve its energy 
policy difficulties; and a growing surplus of natural gas reserves in 
producing regions, which had been prompted by the high intrastate prices and 
which was softening those prices and leading some producer interests to 
support the compromise in order to have access to the supposed pent-up demand 
in the interstate market. But the interstate market itself had quietly 
changed: Many industrial customers who had suffered due to curtailments had 
discovered that they could do without large amounts of the natural gas they 
had been buying through conservation practices, and a large number had 
switched to fuel oil, which had been relatively stable in price since the 
Arab oil embargo of 1973 and was predicted to be developing a glut on the 
world market. They were not eager to break their oil contracts and return to 
natural gas when they were still at the bottom of the curtailment priorities, 
when they were told that their use would be phased out, when incremental 
pricing would keep gas prices near oil price levels, and when long-term 
service of natural gas depended on better resources than many thought 
existed. 
The compromise was truly that -- a creation of the moderate .elements of 
both sides -- and a rough coalition of the extremes on both sides formed to 
oppose it. Some producers favored it, others opposed it, and potent lobbies 
for deregulation found themselves unable to take a firm position one way or 
another. Most gas pipelines and distributors accepted it with reservations 
about the incremental pricing provisions, realizing that these would make 
regaining their lost industrial customers much more difficult. The drawn-out 
agony of the process of compromise, the earlier filibusters, the public 
expectation that Congress would enact significant energy legislation, and the 
constant badgering from both sides, had led many Members to lean towards 
passage, if only to get the divisive issue behind them and turn to other 
things, including the 1978 election, then 6 weeks away. The proponents of 
the compromise were quick to capitalize on this mood by threatening to refuse 
to consider any other proposals should the compromise be defeated. The 
President fervently campaigned for the bill, citing its forecasted benefits 
in strengthening the dollar and the economy, and permitting interstate access 
to a huge "gas bubblew of surplus intrastate gas. The Senate acted first, 
refusing recommittal of the compromise by a wide margin and then passing the 
bill, 57-42 on Sept. 27, 1978. 
The House vote was likely to be much closer, so the leadership wanted to 
combine the gas bill with the other four parts -- all also substantially 
changed from the original proposals -- that made up the National Energy Act, 
and permit one vote on the package. The key vote concerned the rule to 
combine the various bills for a single vote. It passed by a single vote, 208 
to 207. Without their combination into a package, it is highly likely that 
some of those who favored the rule would have opposed the gas bill as an 
independent enactment. President Carter signed the Natural Gas Policy Act 
into law on Nov. 9 ,  1978, and it became P.L. 95-621. Natural gas had been 
the subject of the first and last enactments of the 95th Congress. 
The Provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
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As Fassed, the NGPA was an extremely c ~ m p l e x  law, one wnich completely 
changed the FERC's previous regulatory system for priclng nacural gas at che 
wellhead. 
Title I of the NGPA included the wellhead pricing provisions. Numerous 
categories of natural gas production were defined in Subtitle A ,  and there 
was some dispute about how many categories had actually been created. Their 
prices were set in the statute, and increased according to differing formulas 
reflecting escalator and inflation factors. Subtitle B provides that 
regulation for some, but not all, categories would end on Jan. 1, 1985, 
subject to being reimposed at the discretion of Congress after a period of 
six months for a period of as long as eighteen months. The major categories 
of natural gas created, by the numbers of the sections of the NGPA which 
created them, were: 
- - Section 102, new natural gas. Intended to include genuine new 
discoveries of gas resources, which started its price path at about $2.08 per 
Mcf and rose at the rate of inflation plus about 4% per year, until all gas 
committed under this category is deregulated in 1985. 
-- Section 103, new onshore production wells. Intended to include 
extension wells expanding known natural gas deposits, which started its price 
path at about $2.00 per Mcf, rose by inflation alone, and will be deregulated 
in 1985 -- except for that part sold interstate and from wells deeper than 
5000 feet. 
- - Section 104, flowing interstate gas. Covers gas which was already 
being sold to interstate pipelines prior to consideration of the NGPA, and 
priced according to the previous standards ($1.45 was the highest ceiling) 
plus inflation, and not deregulated. The section also contains language 
permitting FERC to set other rates that are "just and reasonable," as do 
section 106 and section 109. 
-- Section 105, other natural gas under contract. Primarily flowing 
intrastate gas, limited to the lower levels of the contract price or the 
section 102 price to prevent full operation of contractual escalator clauses, 
plus inflation. 
- - Section 106, rollover gas or gas resold to the same purchaser upon 
expiration of the earlier contract. Limited rollover and resold gas to the 
higher of the earlier price of $.54 per Mcf for interstate gas, and to the 
higher of the contract price or $1.00 per Mcf for intrastate gas. 
-- Section 107, high cost gas. Identified certain potential sources of 
natural gas believed to cost significantly more to develop than others: gas 
from Devonian shales, geopressured acquifers, coal seams, and wells deeper 
than 15,000 feet. These four categories of gas, deregulated in December 
1979, and other categories identified by the FERC, could receive special 
incentive prices. This has particularly been applied to "tight sands" gas, 
gas from relatively nonporous reservoirs. 
-- Section 108, stripper well gas. Invented a distinction to benefit 
owners of small natural gas wells, starting their prices at about $2.22 
escalted by about 4% inflation, but not deregulating them. 
- - Section 109, all other categories, and specifically Alaskan gas from --
the Prudhoe Bay Unit. Priced in accordance with the section 104 provisions, 
and not deregulated. 
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Title 11 of the NGPA established the incremental pricing provisions, 
requiring the FERC to apply incremental pricing to industrial boiler fuel 
facilities served directly or indirectly by interstate pipelines within one 
year, and to expand that rule to apply to other industrial applications by 
six months later. The FERC was given much leeway in implementing incremental 
pricing in order to achieve the statutory objective: the maximum allocation 
of the higher cost of new and high-cost natural gas sold in interstate 
commerce to industrial customers without causing industrial customers to 
switch from natural gas to other fuels. 
Title I11 of the NGPA created permanent authorities similar to the 
temporary emergency authorities of the Emergency Natural Gas Act passed in 
January 1977, allowing the President to declare a gas supply emergency, 
allocate gas among pipelines, and from others who volunteer, to areas of 
shortage. Title IV granted agricultural users of natural gas a higher 
priority during curtailments than any but residential, small commercial, and 
other critical users. Title V presented the administrative mechanism to be 
used by FERC in regulation -- primarily reviewing State agency determinations 
of the category a given well falls in -- and provides standards for court 
review of the NGPA. Title V I  coordinates the NGPA with the Natural Gas Act 
of 1938, the prior statutory basis for gas regulation, much of which applied 
to pipeline operations, accounting, and other aspects of the gas industry 
which were not affected by the NGPA. 
Natural Gas Conservation 
Since the NGPA's passage, and partly as a result of the NGPA, demand for 
natural gas has changed markedly. The conservation among residential and 
commercial users has been remarkable, so that even with many conversions from 
fuel oil and many new hook-ups, the total deliveries to these sectors have 
stayed stable or declined slightly. The prospect is that additional 
conservation will be achieved, and most observers attribute the conservation 
to higher prices. Some gas is used for pipeline operation, and this amount 
will not change much. Industrial users who must use natural gas because of 
its unique properties or chemical constituents and natural gas users in the 
agricultural and food--processing chains have a higher priority for gas when 
curtailments occur than boiler fuel users. Their use has expanded since the 
NGPA, but they have also achieved much conservation and they have been 
affected by poor economic conditions. They are very sensitive to the 
long-term implications of gas supply and sensitive to price stability, since 
their plants are long-term investments, and they would have no alternative 
fuel. The outlook is for continued but cautious growth in this sector of 
natural gas use, not growth at the boom levels seen in the 1960s. 
The key sector in natural gas demand is the large group of industrial 
users who use natural gas in boilers of different sizes and alternate fuel 
capabilities. These users are highly sensitive to natural gas price levels, 
and less sensitive to the long-term supply. Their alternate fuel is 
generally oil, mostly residual fuel oil. As they use more natural gas, their 
use of oil falls. The portion of industrial natural gas use in this category 
is not precisely known, but is at least half of the industrial demand -- the 
half which can rise and fall most rapidly, with the largest effects on oil 
imports, and with th-e-greatest flexibility when curtailments are necessary. 
They have the lowest priorities for gas during curtailments, generally in 
order of the size of their boilers. 
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It is the demand of this market that wiil determine what the marginal gas 
supply will be in the next few years, and policies toward gas prices and 
imported oil will largely determine this demand level. Stimulating and 
serving this demand by making natural gas relatively cheap and available to 
these users over the next few years may reduce oil imports, but it may also 
exhaust more quickly the conventional supplies that we now depend on, 
requiring earlier availability of the supplemental supplies, or threatening 
the long-term service of higher-priority users, and it may force higher 
prices upon other users. In fact, what is happening at this juncture is that 
- - on some gas pipeline systems that have made inopportune decisions 
regarding the price and ancillary terms of gas purchases from producers -- 
there has been significant conversion to cheaper heavy fuel oil by industrial 
consumers. And the trend to residential gas conversion has abated as well. 
These pipeline systems are faced with a declining market share while 
remaining contractually obligated to expensive gas that will not sell in 
today's more competitive market. For this reason, there appears to be 
something of a current oversupply of deliverable, albeit expensive, gas. 
Some Recent Developments Effecting the Natural Gas Situation 
There have been two developments since NGPA1s passage that have shaped the 
institutional framework in which the gas market functions. One is the 
amendment of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Gas Act of 1978 to permit 
existing gas-fired electric plants to burn gas during the remainder of their 
existence. This was accomplished as an amendment to the 1981 budget 
authorization bill in June 1981. This means that utilities -- which use 
about 20% of the nations gas now -- will continue unrestrained use. 
The other matter -- which is still unresolved and is now before the 
Supreme Court -- regards incremental pricing, Title I1 of the law. 
Incremental pricing allocates high-priced gas to industrial consumers up to 
the point that they pay the equivalent of oil fuel prices. NGPA originally 
envisioned boiler fuel users being initially targeted for price increases up 
to the equivalant of relatively cheap high sulfur heavy fuel oil. 
Subsequently, under Phase 11, more industrial users would be covered, and 
their prices would rise to parity with relatively expensive middle 
distillate. 
Phase I of incremental pricing -- affecting boiler fuel users of more than 
300 Mcf per day -- became effective Nov. 1, 1979. Phase 11, affecting 
smaller industrial users to the extent necessary to cover 95% of industrial 
gas use, was to become effective 6 months later. A great deal of concern was 
expressed by industrial users and others that incremental pricing would lead 
to higher industrial fuel prices at a time of inflation and recession. The 
protection afforded residential users by incremental pricing was also 
challenged on the basis that, as incremental pricing forced industrial users 
from natural gas, the system costs of the pipelines and distributors would be 
allocated to the remaining customers. In addition, the cost increases of 
manufactured goods would be paid by their buyers. Legislation was introduced 
to repeal Title I1 in its entirety. But instead, the House of 
Representatives exercised the legislative veto provided in NGPA and voted 
overwhelmingly to veto the regulations implementing Phase I1 incremental 
pricing. This both left the statute intact and Phase I in operation. 
This veto let industrial gas prices remain at the equivalant of high 
sulfur residual fuel oil and limited incremental pricing to a relatively 
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n a r r o w  p o r t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r y .  ? h a s e  I ,  a s  i t  r e m a l n s  i n  e f f e c t ,  r e a l l y  d o e s  
l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  w o u l d  otherwise b e  t h e  c a s e .  W h e r e a s  t h e  l a w  a p p e a r s  t o  
m a n d a t e  t h a t  g a s  b e  i n c r e m e n t a l l y  p r i c e d  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  u s e r s  a t  m i d d l e  
d i s t i l l a t e  p r i c e s ,  t h e  v e t o  m e a n s  t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  f e w  u s e r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  
i n c r e m e n t a l  p r i c i n g  a t  b u r n e r  t i p  p r i c e s  o f  a b o u t  $ 4 . 0 0  p e r  M c f .  T h e  P h a s e  
I1 p l a n ,  s e e m i n g l y  m a n d a t e d  b y  NGPA, w o u l d  h a v e  e f f e c t e d  9 5 %  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
u s e  a n d  w o u l d  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  i n c r e m e n t a l  p r i c e s  o f  a b o u t  $ 6 . 5 0 .  
T h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  v e t o  was o v e r t u r n e d  b y  t h e  D . C .  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  i n  
J a n u a r y  1 9 8 2 .  T h e  c o u r t  r u l e d  t h a t  t h i s  a c t i o n  was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  a n d  
m a n d a t e d  t h a t  FERC p r o m u l g a t e  a new P h a s e  I 1  p l a n  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  
NGPA's i n t e n t .  T h i s  mat ter  h a s  b e e n  s t a y e d ,  p e n d i n g  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t .  I f  u p h e l d ,  P h a s e  I1 w i l l  e i t h e r  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  o r  t h e  b a s i c  l a w  
a m e n d e d .  
T h e  G a s  M a r k e t  U n d e r  NGPA 
When t h e  p r i c e  o f  c r u d e  o i l  d o u b l e d ,  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  e n e r g y  
m a r k e t s  c h a n g e d ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  r a t h e r  i n f l e x i b l e  NGPA p r i c i n g  s t r u c t u r e  b e h i n d .  
W r i t t e n  w i t h  t h e  g o a l  o f  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  o i l  a n d  n a t u r a l  g a s  p r i c e s  b y  1 9 8 5 ,  
a n d  b r i n g i n g  t h e m  c l o s e r  t o g e t h e r  t h a n  t h e y  had b e e n  d u r i n g  t h e  i n t e r i m ,  NGPA 
f e l l  o u t  o f  c o n t e x t  w i t h  i t s  i n i t i a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e n t .  
T h e  c h a n g e d  e c o n o m i c s  o f  e n e r g y  m a r k e t s  i n t e r a c t e d  w i t h  t h e  l a w  a n d  
p r o d u c e d  many u n i n t e n d e d  a n d  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  r e s u l t s .  N e w  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  
gas  m a r k e t  w e r e  g a i n e d ,  a n d  t h e s e  l e d  t o  c a l l s  f o r  r e m e d i a l  r e g u l a t o r y  
a c t i o n s  b y  FERC a n d ,  i n i t i a l l y ,  t o  c a l l s  f o r  d e r e g u l a t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  " n e w w  
( i f  n o t  a l l )  gas.  T h e  l a t t e r  w e r e  r e p l a c e d ,  a s  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  9 7 t h  
C o n g r e s s  e v o l v e d ,  w i t h  c a l l s  f o r  a r e a d j u s t m e n t  o f  p r i c e s  s o  t h a t  o i l  a n d  gas  
w o u l d  b e  o n  a m o r e  e q u a l  f o o t i n g  a n d  w o u l d  r e a c h  e q u i v a l a n c y  q u i c k e r .  
O p p o s i n g  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  w e r e  c o n s u m e r  g r o u p s ,  who b e c a m e  m o r e  v o c a l  
r e g a r d i n g  q u i t e  r a p i d  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  H . R e s .  3 7 1  was 
i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  H o u s e  w i t h  2 2 6  c o - s p o n s o r s  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  s e n s e  o f  t h e  
H o u s e  t h a t  FERC s h o u l d  t a k e  n o  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  r a t e  
a t  w h i c h  g a s  p r i c e s  were b e i n g  d e c o n t r o l l e d .  
T h e  s t a t u s  a t  t h i s  j u n c t u r e  f i n d s  t h e  a v e r a g e  p r i c e  o f  gas  n a t i o n w i d e  a t  
a b o u t  $ 2 . 7 5  p e r  M c f ,  r o u g h l y  h a l f  t h e  p r i c e  o f  c r u d e  o i l  o n  a b t u  e q u i v a l a n t  
b a s i s .  Gas p r i c e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  NGPA v a r i e s  f r o m  a few c e n t s  p e r  Mcf t o  
o v e r  $ 1 0 ,  w i t h  C a n a d i a n  a n d  M e x i c a n  i m p o r t s  a t  j u s t  u n d e r  $ 5 .  U n d e r  t h e  NGPA 
p h a s e o u t  of p r i c e  c e i l i n g s ,  much g a s  w i l l  b e  d e c o n t r o l l e d  o n  J a n .  1, 1985 .  
H o w e v e r ,  b e c a u s e  n o t  a l l  c l a s s e s  o f  g a s  w i l l  b e  d e c o n t r o l l e d ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  
c o n t r a c t s  b e t w e e n  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  p i p e l i n e s  w i l l  l i m i t  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  e s c a l a t i o n  
f o r  s o m e  g a s  t h a t  m i g h t  o t h e r w i s e  r i s e  t o  u n c o n t r o l l e d  l e v e l s ,  b e t w e e n  4 0 - 6 0 %  
o f  f l o w i n g  o i l  w i l l  ' r e m a i n  u n d e r  c o n t r o l s  o r  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l s  i n  e a r l y  
1 9 8 6 .  
How t h e  law,  c h a n g e d  e v e n t s ,  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t s  u n d e r  t h e  l a w  s i n c e  i t s  
e n a c t m e n t  w i l l  p l a y  o u t  -- v i e w e d  w i t h  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  g a i n e d  i n  
t h e  p a s t  4 y e a r s  -- r e p r e s e n t s  i n t e r e s t i n g  p o l i c y  c o n c e r n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
f u t u r e  o f  g a s  m a r k e t s .  What  d o e s  s e e m  t o  b e  h a p p e n i n g  n o w ,  a n d  m a n y  
e c o n o m i s t s  f o l l o w i n g  g a s  m a r k e t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  f e e l  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  i s  t h a t  p i p e l i n e s  w i t h  l a r g e  a m o u n t s  o f  g a s  c o n t r o l l e d  a t  l o w  
p r i c e s  t e n d  t o  p a y  v e r y  h i g h  p r i c e s  f o r  w h a t  u n c o n t r o l l e d  g a s  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
t h e m .  T h e y  a l s o  a p p e a r  t o  a l l o w  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  c o n t r o l l e d  gas  u n d e r  c o n t r a c t  
t o  t h e m  t o  r i s e  f r o m  l o w e r  c o n t r a c t u a l  p r i c e s  t o  maximum l a w f u l  o n e s .  T h e  
s i t u a t i o n  c a n  b e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  w i t h  t h i s  s o m e w h a t  o v e r s i m p l i f i e d  e x a m p l e :  
C R S -  9 
Assume that half of all gas were to be deregulated and half were zo be 
c~ntrolled at $2.50. Assume further that the market clearing price for gas 
were $5.00. What, then, would unregulated gas sell for? A great deal of 
current thought, particularly among economists, would have gas prices 
determined by pipelines competing for supply. They would bid unregulated gas 
prices up to the point where they could not sell any more -- that is to say, 
the point where their weighted average gas cost was at the market clearing 
price of $5.00. Thus, the half of gas supply which is not regulated in this 
example would sell for $7.50. 
This contradicts the old conventional wisdom, which held that pipelines 
would be unwilling to pay prices in excess of market clearing levels for new 
gas supply. The fact is that consumers -- the customers of pipelines -- are 
likely to be unwilling to pay above market clearing prices for whatever blend 
of gas pipelines have to provide. Knowing this, and having the ability to 
average or "roll in" various gas prices, pipelines will compete for gas 
supply and will bid gas up to the point where the rolled in price they charge 
their customers reaches the point where they can sell no more -- in other 
words, the market clearing consumer price. 
The other part of the "new economicsR which is relevant for the policy 
debate is a better understanding -- or at least a new perception -- of how 
wellhead prices are determined. Earlier thinking had wellhead prices 
equilibrating with the btu equivalant price of crude oil, middle distillate, 
or o ~ e  of the types of residual fuel oil, depending on which version of this 
thinking was being articulated. The current perception sees wellhead prices 
being determined at the burner tip. This means that the market clearing for 
energy -- whatever that may actually be -- will determine wellhead prices. 
Wellhead prices will then be the burner tip price, less the local 
distribution utility tariff, less the long distance pipeline tariff. If, for 
example, burner tip prices are set in competition with 1% sulfur residual 
fuel, now about $27/bbl or roughly $4.25/million btu's (the equivalant of an 
Mcf of gas), this could back down to an implied wellhead price quite close to 
the present $2.75 average. 
Whatever the current or future market clearing gas price may be, in 
contemporary discussion regarding this figure it is often given in terms of a 
fraction of crude oil prices. For example, much current thought holds that 
the market clearing price either is or should be about 70% of the crude 
price. The American Gas Association claims the current market clearing price 
to be about 60%. In any case, the current average wellhead price is somewhat 
less than half current crude price equivalancy. 
The Natural Gas Market -- Developments During 1982 
1982 has been a confusing year for energy prices generally. Oil prices, 
for example, rose fairly sharply during mid-year in the face of very soft 
demand, presenting something of a paradox. Now, natural gas prices appear to 
be following a similar pattern. Pipelines which heretofore had been hard 
pressed for new supplies made commitments for several types of higher-cost 
gas. Apart from higher-priced new, but still controlled gas (section 102), 
pipelines also bid for expensive gas in section 106 and section 107. Section 
107 gas consists of uncontrolled deep gas (from zones below 15,000 feet) and 
other difficult-to-produce gas now controlled at about $5.50. In toto, the 
average price of gas in both interstate and intrastate pipeline systems rose, 
approximating market clearing levels. On some pipeline systems, gas costs 
rose to above market clearing levels, which meant that some of the more price 
s e n s ~ t i v e  z u s t o m e r s  r e d u c e d  3r n a l t e d  c o m p l e t e l y   heir gas  ~ u r c h a s e s .  The  
r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  a n  a p p a r e n t  s u r p l u s  o f  d e l i v e r a b l e  g a s ,  w l t h  n u m e r o u s  r e p o r t s  
o f  s h u t - i n  w e l l s  a n d  w i t h  s c a t t e r e d  r e p o r t s  o f  g a s  b e i n g  f l a r e d .  
I n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h i s  s e e m i n g  o v e r s u p p l y ,  1 9 8 1  t u r n e d  i n t o  a  b a n n e r  y e a r  f o r  
g a s  r e s e r v e  a d d i t i o n s .  R e s p o n d i n g  t o  r e c o r d  d r i l l i n g  a c t i v i t y ,  new r e s e r v e s  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  1 9 6 8  e x c e e d e d  p r o d u c t i o n .  2 1 . 3  t c f  o f  g a s  was 
d i s c o v e r e d ,  e x c e e d i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  b y  a b o u t  1 0 % .  Now p r o d u c e r s  a p p e a r  t o  b e  
h a v i n g  d i f f i c u l t y  m a r k e t i n g  t h e  g a s  t h e y  f o u n d ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  f i n d i n g  t a k e r s  
f o r  t h e i r  new g a s  a t  t h e  p r i c e s  t h e y  l i k e l y  a n t i c i p a t e d  when d r i l l i n g  t h e  
w e l l s  i n  1 9 8 0  o r  1 9 8 1 .  
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  r e a l i t i e s  t h a t  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  c r e a t e d  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  
w h e r e i n  g a s  p r i c e s  a r e  r i s i n g  a n d  s u p p l i e s  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  g r o u n d .  T h e  f i r s t  
i s  t h a t  p i p e l i n e s  h a v e  c o m m i t t e d  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  m o r e  g a s  t h a n  t h e y  c a n  a b s o r b  
a t  p r i c e s  w h i c h  -- o n  a v e r a g e  -- a r e  e s c a l a t i n g  r a p i d l y .  Many p i p e l i n e s  a r e  
f i n d i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  o v e r - c o m m i t t e d  a n d ,  i n  some  i n s t a n c e s ,  t i e d  i n t o  t a k e  o r  
p a y  c o n t r a c t s ,  w h i c h  r e q u i r e  p a y m e n t  f o r  minimum a m o u n t s  o f  g a s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
w h e t h e r  t h e  p i p e l i n e  t a k e s  t h e  g a s  o r  n o t .  T h e s e  p a y m e n t s  -- f o r  g a s  n o t  
a c t u a l l y  t a k e n  -- a r e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  p a s s e d  o n  t o  e n d  u s e r s  t h r u  t h e  p u r c h a s e d  
g a s  a d j u s t m e n t  c l a u s e s  t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  p i p e l i n e s  h a v e  i n  t h e i r  t a r i f f  
p r o v i s i o n s .  U n i t  p r i c e s  o f  g a s  a c t u a l l y  s o l d  t h e r e f o r e  r i s e  t o  p a y  f o r  g a s  
n e v e r  d e l i v e r e d .  T h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  g a s  s o l d  o n  t h a t  p i p e l i n e  
s y s t e m .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  many p i p e l i n e s  f o r m e d  t h e i r  own p r o d u c t i o n  a f f i l i a t e s .  
P i p e l i n e  a f f i l i a t e d  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  a l l o w e d  t h e  h i g h e s t  p r i c e s  f o r  t h a t  g a s  
s o l d  i n  t h i r d - p a r t y ,  n o n - a f f i l i a t e d  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  a n d  t h i s  i n c l u d e s  
u n r e g u l a t e d  s e c t i o n  1 0 7  g a s  t o o .  P i p e l i n e s ,  i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e ,  h a v e  s t r o n g  
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  own a f f i l i a t e s '  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  g a s  u n d e r  t a k e  o r  p a y  
c o n t r a c t s  i n  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  o t h e r  g a s  t h a t  may b e  l o w e r  p r i c e d .  And o t h e r  g a s  
d o e s  t e n d  t o  be l o w e r  p r i c e d ,  b e c a u s e  t a k e  o r  p a y  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  a f f i l i a t e s  
t e n d  t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  p h e n o m e n a  a n d  i n v o l v e  t h e  n e w e r ,  m o s t  e x p e n s i v e  
o f  NGPA g a s .  
A l l  t h i s  t e n d s  t o  d e f i n e  a c a s c a d i n g  p r o b l e m .  G a s  f l o w i n g  i n  t h e  N a t i o n ' s  
p i p e l i n e  s y s t e m  now h a s  e s c a l a t e d  t o  t h e  p o i n t  w h e r e  n o t  a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a n  b e  s o l d .  I n  b a c k i n g  o u t  u n s o l d  s u p p l i e s ,  p i p e l i n e s  c a n ,  a n d  
i n  some c a s e s  a c t u a l l y  d o ,  r a i s e  t h e  a v e r a g e  u n i t  p r i c e  o f  f l o w i n g  g a s .  T h e  
h i g h e r  p r i c e s  mean l o w e r  s a l e s ,  a n d  t h i s  c o u l d  become  a r e c u r s i v e  t h e m e .  
T h e  s e c o n d  r e a l i t y  i s  t h a t  t h e  m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  p r i c e  f o r  g a s  i s  much 
l o w e r ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  o i l  f u e l  p r i c e s ,  t h a n  m o s t  s t u d e n t s  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
( p o l i c y m a k e r s  i n c l u d e d )  t h o u g h t  i t  was when NGPA was b e i n g  c r a f t e d .  What  i s  
b e c o m i n g  a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c l e a r  f a c t  o f  l i f e  i s  t h a t  b u r n e r  t i p  p r i c e s  h a v e  t o  
be c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  o i l  f u e l s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e s i d u a l  f u e l .  B u t  b u r n e r  t i p  
p r i c e s  embody b o t h  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  a n d  l o c a l  p i p e l i n e  u t i l i t y  t a r i f f s ,  as  w e l l  
a s  t h e  w e l l h e a d  p r i c e  o f  t h e  g a s .  T h e  l i k e l y  b u r n e r  t i p  m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  
p r i c e  i s  t h e  B t u  e q u i v a l a n t  o f  r e s i d u a l  f u e l ,  a n d  t h e  l i k e l y  w e l l h e a d  m a r k e t  
c l e a r i n g  p r i c e  w i l l  b e  t h i s  l e s s  t h e  u t i l i t y  t a r i f f s  i n v o l v e d .  W h i l e  t h i s  i s  
s o m e t h i n g  o f  a n  o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  -- s i n c e  n o t  a l l  u t i l i t y  t a r i f f s  a r e  e q u a l  
( t h e y  v a r y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w i t h  l e n g t h  o f  h a u l  f r o m  t h e  g a s  f i e l d )  a n d  r e s i d  
i s n ' t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  o r  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  f u e l  i n  a l l  cases  -- t h e  
e x a m p l e  d e l i n e a t e s  a s e t  o f  e c o n o m i c s  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  p r i c e s .  And t o d a y  
t h e s e  e c o n o m i c  f o r c e s  s e e m  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  many t y p e s  o f  g a s  p r i c e s  a r e  t o o  
h i g h  t o  b e  s o l d .  
S t a n d i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  b u r n e r  t i p  a n d  w e l l h e a d  a r e  t h e  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  a n d  
local distribution pipeline utilicles. in ~ r d e r  for tne market zonditions a c  
the burner tip -- where prices are determined -- to affect wellhead prices, 
price signals must be transmitted through two independent entities -- the 
local distribution utility and the long-distance pipeline - -  back to the also 
independent producer. This process is really new. In the past, gas 
pipelines typically could sell all the gas they could get, and they have 
never had to exercise the option of passing price signals back down the pipe 
to the wellhead. How well this will work is now in the process of being 
tested. 
Recent months have seen some price signals begin to get passed back down 
the pipe. One of the first signs of this has been the decline in the prices 
of deep (unregulated) section 107 gas. Some gas in this class reached the 
$10 mark, but many pipelines have had great trouble with the highest-priced 
gas and have renegotiated contract prices or otherwise gotten out of 
excessively expensive commitments or are in the process of doing so. 
During the summer of 1982, producers selling new gas began to face great 
difficulty. Marketing gas at prices above $3.00 became difficult, because 
pipelines were either overcommitted under pre-existing gas contracts or could 
not absorb gas which would raise their weighted average or delivered price. 
In fact, pipelines that made commitments to higher priced gas were in no 
position to take advantage of new offers of supply that might be priced below 
earlier c o n t r a c t u a l . c o m m i t m e n t s .  Whether or not pipelines are willing or 
able to renegotiate the higher of their gas contracts to take advantage of 
what appears to be a near-term oversupply will be tested in the months ahead. 
To some extent, this will provide an indication of how well gas markets work, 
with important implications for the price control debate. 
A bottom-line policy consideration seems to be developing. In the current 
market, wellhead prices in the $2.75/Mcf area seem to translate into burner 
tip prices at about market clearing levels. If this is actually true, then 
those favoring deregulation of wellhead prices could make a very convincing 
point -- that immediate decontrol would not raise prices, at least in the 
current energy pricing environment. Those opposing decontrol would likely 
argue that the pipeline industry has yet to prove it can deal effectively 
with producers in terms of keeping gas supply prices economically. They 
would question pipelines ability to contract at the wellhead such that gas 
can be delivered at market clearing prices. It is likely that the next 6 to 
1 2  months will yield an indication of who is correct. 
Administrative Issues Before FERC 
In the context of NGPA and prices being out of step with those of oil, 
there are a number of administrative matters under consideration at FERC 
which are relevant to the policy discussion. Among the more important are 
the following issues: 
* "Vintagingl' -- Gas in sections 104, 106, and small amounts in section 
109 is price controlled in several tiers based on the "spud" date of the 
well. Prices of section 104 gas range from about $2.25 for old gas down to 
27 cents per Mcf for "oldestw gas, for example. After some discussion of the 
pro's and con's of having such a wide dispersion of old gas prices, FERC 
issued a Notice of Inquiry (04/28/82) on the matter in order to collect 
information. It should be emphasized that this is not a rulemaking, although 
it could lead to one. The goal here is to determine the wisdom of placing 
all old gas in one, higher priced class. This would raise the average price 
of gas substactially. 
The vintaging matter is often associated with what has come to be called 
the market ordering problem or market disorder. What has happened is that 
the old gas provides "a cushion" so that pipelines can acquire gas at much 
higher prices than it could be sold for on its own. This gas can be made 
marketable by averaging its price in with old gas, so that the blend price is 
competitive at the burner tip. This has led to purchases of unregulated 
section 107 gas at attention-focusing prices, some above $10.00. It has 
likely led to repricing of other gas under contract at below-ceiling prices, 
and to purchases of gas at high-ceiling prices Which would be uneconomic 
without the "cushion." 
Additionally, intrastate pipelines assert that they are at a comparative 
disadvantage relative to intrastate systems since they have had historically 
higher gas acquisition costs and less of a cushion. Hence, they are unable 
to bid successfully for new supply against the comparatively better cushioned 
interstates. This has become a regional issue of some concern. 
* Near Deep Gas -- With gas from zones below 15,000 ft. unregulated, FERC 
has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding gas from the 10,000 to 
15,000 ft. zone. The proposal would raise the price of gas from these strata 
to 150% of its NGPA price. This would create incentive for deeper drilling - - where gas prospects are better -- and would create disincentives to drill 
all the way to 15,000 ft. simply to qualify for a higher price. 
* Gas Produced in Deep Water -- FERC went through all the administrative 
procedures needed to raise the price of gas produced from waters 300-feet 
deep or deeper by 200% in excess of the statutory rate. However, the 
commission never brought the matter to a vote, and the issue is now in limbo. 
* Cap on Sec. 107 gas -- There has been informal discussion about placing 
a floating ceiling on unregulated gas in this class, perhaps tying it to 70% 
of crude prices. This gas has sold for $10 in some cases. 
* Incremental pricing -- If the Phase I1 ruling is sustained, the 
Commission may have to promulgate a new incremental pricing rule. Some 
preliminary study is now ongoing at the staff level regarding what type of 
Phase I1 plan may be brought forward. 
Legislative Issues 
The 97th Congress has been disinclined to take up the natural gas 
regulation issue with any vigor. Hearings were held by the Senate Energy 
Committee in November 1981 and March 1982. Similarly, the House Synthetic 
and Fossil Fuels Subcommittee held hearings in July and August 1982. Little 
in the way of consensus, much less legislation, emerged from these hearings. 
Two similar pieces of legislation, H.R. 5866 (Gramm) and S. 2074 (Johnston) 
seem to capture the essence of thought of those seeking deregulation. The 
main provisions of those bills are: 
* Repeal of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, which 
constrains natural gas use; 
* Repeal of incremental pricing; 
* 3-year phaseout of all price ceilings, aimed at converging gas prices on 
7 C %  of crude oli equivaiancy by Jan. 1 ,  1985. itemoves all F E R C  authority for 
post-1985 prlce controls; 
* Capping high cost gas (section 107) at 70% of crude equivalancy; 
* Facilitating intrastate pipelines access to Outer Continental Shelf 
Areas now primarily reserved for interstate pipelines; 
* A variety of provisions aimed at giving pipelines legislative authority 
to deal with disadvantageous producer contracts. 
The only item on the natural gas agenda that actually came close to a vote 
this Congress was H.Res. 371. This represented a statement by the 
anti-deregulation forces that NGPA should not be administratively tampered 
with. As such, it encapsulates the pro-regulation sentiment at this time: 
preserve the status quo. H.Res. 371 was intended to be a device to bring 
political pressure to bear on FERC, halting the progress of administrative 
procedures oriented toward raising the price of old gas, specifically that in 
section 104. It was introduced with 226 co-sponsors, but was never acted 
upon. In spite of this, those opposing administrative measures raising gas 
prices cite the measure as indicative of the wsense of Congress" that NGPA's 
statuatory pricing structure should not be tampered with. 
LEGISLATION 
H.Res. 371 (Dingell et dl.) 
Expresses the sense of the Mouse that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission should take no action to accelerate the decontrol of wellhead 
natural gas prices. 
H. J.Res. 467 (Corcoran) 
Provides for the expiration of the waiver of laws granted for the Alaska - 
natural gas transportation system unless the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission issues, on or before Dec. 15, 1983, a final certificate of public 
convenience and necessity for the approved transporation system. Prohibits 
any Federal financial assistance for the transportation system after approval 
of this resolution. Introduced Apr. 29, 1982. 
H.R. 5645 (Hartel et al.) 
Amends the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to declare unenforceable any 
take-or-pay clause of any contract which is entered into on or after 
enactment of this Act and which is applicable to any first or subsequent sale 
of natural gas. Introduced Mar. 1 ,  1982; referred to Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. 
H.R. 5646 (Hetel et al.) 
Amends the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to declare unenforceable 
indefinite price escalator clauses in natural gas contracts. Applicable to 
any first or subsequent sale of natural gas. Introduced Mar. 1, 1982; 
referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
H.R. 5866 ( ~ r a m m )  
Xepeals the Powerplanc and Industrial Fuel Use Act of i978. Terminates 
the incremental pricing requirements of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. 
Repeals provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
relating to retail policies for natural gas utilities. Provides for the 
decontrol of natural gas. Introduced Mar. 17, 1982. 
H.R. 5923 (Collins, J., by request) 
Amends the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 and the Department of 
Energy Organization Act with respect to the disclosure of energy information 
obtained from Federal agencies. Repeals specified energy information 
reporting requirements under the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination 
Act of 1974, the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, the Department of 
Energy Organization Act, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 
and the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979. Introduced Mar. 23, 1982. 
H.R. 5954 (Mottl et al.) 
Amends the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to repeal provisions providing 
for the decontrol of natural gas prices. Introduced Mar. 24, 1982. 
H.R. 6331 (Young, R., et al.) 
Amends the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to: (1) eliminate the monthly 
indexing of wellhead natural gas prices; and (2) allow increase in such 
prices prior to the expiration of natural gas price controls only to the 
extent justified by increases in the cost of producing natural gas. 
Introduced June 3, 1982. 
H.R. 6850 (Young, R.) 
Amends the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 to provide for continuation of 
price controls beyond 1985. Eliminates the monthly indexing of wellhead 
natural gas prices. Allows increase in such prices prior to the expiration 
of natural gas price controls only to the extent justified on the basis of 
increases in the cost of producing natural gas. Introduced July 22, 1982. 
S.Res. 331 (Chafee et al.) 
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission should take no action to accelerate the decontrol of wellhead 
natural gas prices. Introduced Mar. 3, 1982. 
S. 2074 (Johnston et al.) 
Repeals the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978. Amends the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to repeal provisions relating 
to retail policies for natural gas. Provides for the deregulation of 
committed or dedicated natural gas under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. 
S. 2292 (Metzenbaum et al.) 
Amends the Federal Power Act to require the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission to approve, upon application by a public utility and after 
examination of the propriety of the costs involved, the inclusion in the 
wholesale rate base of construction work in progress with respect to: (1) 
construction of pollution control facilities; or (2) conversion of oil or 
gas-fired facilities. Provides that public utility charges based upon costs 
associated with o t h e r  construction work in prograss shall be considered 
unreasonable. 
S. 2358 (McClure by request) 
Authorizes the F e d e r a l  Energy Regulatory Commission to a s s e s s  and collect* 
f e e s  from natural g a s  companies, public utilities, and common carriers for 
services and privileges rendered under its regulatory programs. 
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